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Building a Blue Economy in the Arctic Ocean: Sustaining the Sea, or Sustaining 
the State? 
 
Philip Steinberg & Berit Kristoffersen 
 
Forthcoming in:  
Gad UP & Strandsbjerg J (eds) 2018 Politics of Sustainability. 
Reconfiguring identity, time and space in the Arctic, Routledge (Routledge 
Studies in Sustainability) 
 
 “The Norwegian government’s new ocean strategy is all about 
increasing opportunities for sustainable growth, creating more 
jobs and exploiting the potential of our oceans.”  
Per Sandberg, Norwegian Minister of Fisheries (Progress Party), 
at the European Commission for Fisheries, April 24th 2017 
 
 “If I had the chance to define the High North Strategy for the 
years ahead, then the connecting link for the next chapter in the 
story about Norway, all of Norway, which would sum up climate 
change, nature, environment, knowledge, people, challenges, 
expectations, [and] geopolitics, is the emphasis on the sea.”  
Jonas Gahr Støre (leader of the Labour Party), “The High North – 
10 years later. At the beginning of a new chapter in the story 
about Norway”, lecture at UiT – the Arctic University of Norway, 
November 10th 2015  
 
 
Introduction 
 
As sustainability discourses extend to the Arctic, planners and politicians are 
faced with the fact that the Arctic is fundamentally a maritime region. The oceans 
cover the majority of the planet’s surface, and the Arctic is no exception. 
Although precise definitions of the Arctic vary (Arctic Human Development 
Report 2004: 18), by any definition the Arctic remains unified by a central ocean 
that takes up the majority of its expanse (Steinberg 2016).  As such, any strategy 
for developing the Arctic’s economies or securing its environmental future must 
be, necessarily, a maritime strategy. And thus it should come as no surprise that 
calls for sustainable development in the Arctic are linked with the global turn to 
a Blue Economy. 
 
 In this chapter, we explore this turn through an investigation of 
Norwegian ocean policy. As the quotations above illustrate, Norwegian officials 
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from both the right (e.g. Per Sandberg) and the left (e.g. Jonas Gahr Støre) have 
systematically argued for ‘sustainable growth’ in the ocean as essential for the 
country’s future. By extending this Blue Economy discourse from its origins in 
fisheries to the breadth of ocean uses, Norway is opening up political space to 
redefine its Arctic policy. At the same time, we argue, Norway is engineering a 
new future for its all-important offshore oil and gas industry by placing it within 
an emergent ‘blue’ ideal for integrated ocean management. In effect, then, by 
locating the Norwegian state’s primary mission – sustaining itself – within a 
more conventional referent object of the sustainability discourse – the ocean 
environment – the Norwegian state is proposing a future where its governmental 
authority is both enabled and exemplified by its rational management of ocean 
resources. 
 
 To develop this argument, the remainder of this chapter proceeds in three 
parts. First we consider the literature on Blue Economy discourse and 
development programmes, drawing in particular on the work of Young Rae Choi 
(2017) who, in her study of China’s ocean development strategy, emphasises that 
the Blue Economy is neither simply a well-intentioned programme for 
sustainable development nor a cynical attempt at ‘green-grabbing’. Rather, Choi 
argues, promotion of a Blue Economy should be seen as part of the effort to 
apply state governmentality in an emergent space of sovereign interest. We then 
apply this analysis to the Arctic through a study of Norway’s Blue Economy 
initiative that is shaping state policy with reference to its northern resource 
frontiers. We conclude by suggesting that in its effort to group together 
numerous competing ocean uses within a single, sustainably managed, ocean 
industry, the Norwegian state constructs the ocean as a space that is beyond 
politics and therefore appropriate for state intervention. This finding, in turn, 
suggests that when the sustainability discourse is integrated with a post-political 
managerial agenda, the ultimate referent object of sustainability may be the 
manager itself: in this case, the state. 
 
The Blue Economy as Sustainability Strategy 
 
In their comprehensive review of calls for a Blue Economy at the 2012 United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (the ‘Rio + 20’ conference), 
Silver et al. (2015: 137) locate the term within the broader promotion of a Green 
Economy: a “managerial ontology of natural capital” in which a state’s natural 
resources become valued as capital stock, with its value typically incorporating 
its ecosystem services as well as its extractive resource potential. In contrast 
with ‘brown’ development models in which resources are costed without regard 
to their externalities, in the Green Economy (and, by extension, its maritime, 
Blue, version), the rational management of these resources (including through 
internalisation of externalities) is to be taken up by partnerships of states, global 
finance bodies, and environmental NGOs, with measured liquidation of these 
resources to be undertaken by private capital (see also, Winder and Le Heron 
2017). 
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 Green (and Blue) Economy programmes locate themselves within the 
broader sustainability discourse, but then take that discourse in a specific 
direction that favours the economisation of nature’s capital (Corson and 
McDonald 202; Onesti 2012). Silver et al. (2015) are generally critical of this 
economisation programme. It effectively reduces the environment to use value 
while justifying the combination of public management with private 
accumulation that is the hallmark of neoliberalism. In the process, the concern 
for equity that frequently features within the rhetoric, if not the actual practice, 
of sustainable development initiatives is subsumed within an overarching 
agenda for growth and accumulation.  
 
 Nonetheless, Silver et al. caution that when Green Economy discourse is 
applied to the ocean – through references to the Blue Economy – there is more at 
hand than the ‘green grabbing’ characterised by the Green Economy’s critics. In 
their analysis of references to the Blue Economy at Rio + 20, Silver et al. identify 
four distinct elements: a ‘natural capital’ discourse that values the ocean for its 
long-term ecosystem services and that typically calls for the enrolment of large 
financial institutions (e.g. the World Bank) and global conservation groups (e.g. 
The Nature Conservancy) to facilitate leveraging of this value; a ‘good business’ 
discourse that promotes and commends private enterprise that operates in a 
relatively environmentally friendly manner; a ‘SIDS’ [small island developing 
states] discourse that highlights the ocean’s economic and environmental 
significance in order to facilitate the economic development of these states; and a 
‘small-scale fishers’ discourse wherein appeals to the Blue Economy are used to 
promote the survival of small scale fishers against the threats posed by 
overfishing by large-scale, heavily capitalised fishing fleets. While aspects of each 
of these elements can support each other, the four can also work at cross-
purposes, and thus Silver et al. suggest that the Blue Economy discourse 
provides grounds for negotiation rather than simply being a tool of ‘green-
grabbing’ hegemony. 
 
 While Silver et al. shed light on the way in which the Blue Economy 
concept is applied in the framework of global governance initiatives and how it is 
being utilised by SIDS, their analysis appears less well suited for interpreting the 
ways in which the term is being applied in the Arctic. Notably absent from Silver 
et al.’s article is any mention of the ocean resource most prevalent in discussions 
of the maritime Arctic’s resource potential: offshore oil and gas. To an extent, 
this omission is understandable as oil and gas are rarely considered ’green’ (or, 
in the ocean, ‘blue’) industries, although, as is discussed below, in Norway in 
particular the state often takes credit for ‘greening’ oil and gas extraction and 
thereby integrating it into its Blue Economy strategy (see also Kristoffersen 
2015). In addition, the gap may be the result of Silver et al.’s focus on 
international conferences. Oil and gas extraction is presently restricted to areas 
within a single state’s sovereign jurisdiction or, in some instances, in areas 
where two states have bilaterally established a joint development zone. 
Therefore, global regulation of the industry (including its ‘greening’) might best 
be achieved through corporate take-up of best practices rather than through 
spatial management tools. Nonetheless, even if hydrocarbon extraction is 
rejected as an industry that can never be ‘greened’, its persistence in the ocean 
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must be integrated into any understanding of the Blue Economy agenda. As of 
2015, nearly thirty percent of total global oil output came from offshore 
production. Maintaining a focus on oil and gas is particularly important when 
one turns to Norway. Norwegian fields accounted for seven percent of global 
offshore production, and Norway’s Statoil is engaged in production around the 
world (US Department of Energy 2016). 
 
 The inapplicability of Silver et al.’s framework to the Arctic goes beyond 
its omission of oil and gas, however. Silver et al. focus on parts of the world 
where management by international institutions (UN-system organisations, 
bilateral aid bodies, environmental NGOs, etc.) is typically seen as beneficial for 
advancing one or more of the four goals that the authors identify (achieving full 
valuation of the ocean’s resources, promoting good business practices, 
enhancing the development of small island states, or promoting small-scale 
fisheries). By contrast, as was articulated in the Ilulissat Declaration (2008), the 
five Arctic Ocean littoral states prefer a unilateral approach where each state has 
uncompromised sovereignty over the development of ‘its’ ocean. While a limited 
role may be given to cooperatively formed regional organisations (e.g. the Arctic 
Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council), the Ilulissat Declaration makes it clear 
that there is no role for higher global governance bodies, since none is 
sanctioned by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which reigns 
supreme as the spatial management framework for the Arctic Ocean. Reflecting 
on Arctic Blue Economy initiatives, then, it becomes apparent that the problem 
with Silver et al.’s framework is not just that it largely focuses on the Global 
South whilst the Arctic is in the Global North (although parts of the region would 
generally merit classification as ‘Global South’ when using standard development 
indicators). Rather, the ill fit stems from the fact that in the Arctic Blue Economy 
strategies are more often associated with national and regional ‘sustainable 
development’ initiatives than with attempts to marshal global conservation 
capital, secure global development funds, or support small-scale fisheries. 
 
 Given the differences between applications of Blue Economy discourse in 
the Global South and Global North, one might assume that a better entry point 
for understanding Arctic Blue Economy initiatives would be Winder and Le 
Heron’s (2017) study of Blue Economy references in European Union workshops 
and policy documents. Winder and Le Heron understand ocean-space as an 
assemblage of multiple practices and elements that intersect, inform each other, 
and congeal into institutions in varying and unstable ways. Winder and Le Heron 
suggest that the Blue Economy assembles the ocean in one specific way 
(particularly with reference to its biological and economic properties) while 
forestalling other possible assemblages. Significantly, though, they also note that 
once one understands the ocean (and its rhetorical-institutional frameworks) as 
assemblages one frees oneself to consider alternate rationalities for ocean 
management, and they develop this final point through a consideration of ocean 
management initiatives in New Zealand. 
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 Winder and Le Heron’s assemblage approach has been thoroughly 
considered and critiqued from numerous angles,1 and we will not rehearse all of 
these critiques here. However two bear further elaboration. One concerns the 
relatively weak version of assemblage theory employed by Winder and Le Heron 
and the suggestion, articulated by Bear (2017), that to truly understand the 
ocean as an assemblage one must also accommodate the mosaic of temporalities 
and spatialities (rhythms, repetitions, stabilisations, and destabilisations) that 
constitute the ocean’s materiality (see also, Steinberg and Peters, 2015). 
Although we do not belabour this point in the analysis of Norway’s ocean 
development strategy that follows, elsewhere we have demonstrated how 
Norway’s policies for oil and gas extraction in its icy waters seek to stabilise and 
rationalise the intersection of climatological, biological, and oceanographic 
forcings that vary over time and space and that, in their very complexity, defy 
stabilisation into fixed, essential categories (Steinberg, Kristoffersen, and Shake, 
2018). 
 
 Of greater relevance to our concern with the role of sustainability 
narratives within Blue Economy programmes, however, is the critique by Choi 
(2017), who stresses that an explicit consideration of governmentality is largely 
missing from Winder and Le Heron’s analysis. In her analysis of China’s Blue 
Economy policy, Choi writes, 
It is on the one hand an expansion of capitalist space driven by the state 
to the oceans, which are perceived as underdeveloped frontier spaces 
through which infinite possibilities of “better” uses are imagined, 
institutionalized, and invested. On the other hand, it is intrinsically a 
spatial intervention that rearranges people and resources so as to avoid 
waste and to achieve their economic use. In other words, infinite 
possibilities collide with finite space. (Choi, 2017: 39, emphasis added) 
The need to foster ‘infinite possibilities’ in ‘finite space’, in turn, requires far-
seeing management of spaces and the practices that occur within them. Proactive 
management is required to prevent environmental decline (e.g. from overfishing, 
unregulated pollutant outflow, etc.), to stave off conflict (e.g. between seascape-
dependent coastal tourism industries and unsightly offshore wind farms), and to 
foster emergent industries that will require state-sponsored investment before 
becoming profitable (e.g. deep sea bioprospecting).  Thus, in China, the Blue 
Economy agenda has been used to justify “a comprehensive sea governance 
system through which the country’s sovereign sea space is imagined and 
managed in its entirety” (Choi, 2017: 38). 
 
 Significantly, although this “embedding [of the] marine economy in 
national development planning… has made sovereign sea space increasingly 
visible and legible and effectively conceptualized it primarily as economic space”  
(Choi, 2017: 39), it has not been accompanied by the reduction of the ocean to a 
de-natured spatial abstraction. Rather, the Blue Economy is constructed as 
particularly sensitive to nature’s variations and interdependencies. Substantial 
resources are devoted to expanding knowledge of the sea, not just to increase 
                                                        
1 The issue of Dialogues in Human Geography in which Winder and Le Heron’s 
(2017) article appeared (vol. 7, no. 1) also included five critical responses. 
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extractive potential but also to inform policy that can sustain its numerous 
environments. The ocean’s future – China’s future – is defined as one that 
necessarily must be sustainable. This is understood as requiring comprehensive 
management, as well as cutting edge science to support that management. 
However, this knowledge is always carried with an eye toward defining and 
separating the ocean’s numerous processes, physical states, functions, and uses. 
The sustainability of the sea and the sustainability of the state are thus 
seamlessly interwoven: A vibrant sea economy is required to sustain the state 
and a strong, managerial state is required to sustain the sea as an environment of 
resources and riches. 
 
 The pathway toward the goal of sustainability is thus characterised by the 
institutionalisation of spatial rationalities that, in the interest of regulation, 
simplify the very processes that they attempt to sustain. To quote Choi again: 
The natural attributes have not changed; it is the new relations between 
the natural world and the economy, assembled in the soil of the desire for 
economic growth and technological optimism that justify particular uses 
in particular geographic places. (Choi, 2017: 39) 
In our previous work on Norway’s efforts to manage oil and gas activities in the 
Southeast Barents Sea, we similarly illustrated how ocean management, although 
informed by an attentiveness to the complex biological processes of ecoclines, 
resulted in a reduction of dynamic surfaces to static binary categories that 
neither adequately reflected temporal-spatial variability nor accounted for the 
complex processes whose vulnerability initiated the planning process in the first 
place (Steinberg and Kristoffersen, 2017; Steinberg, Kristoffersen, and Shake, 
2018). In this chapter, as we move our focus to Norway’s broader effort to 
construct a Blue Economy, we find that the effort to achieve sustainable 
development in Norway’s maritime Arctic is accompanied by a mixture of 
optimism and concern similar to that which characterises the Chinese effort: 
once the ocean is established as a space of ‘infinite possibilities in finite spaces’, 
one requires comprehensive management to maximise potential, minimise harm, 
and ensure a sustainable future. 
 
Norway: The Arctic Blue Economy as Maritime Manifest 
Destiny   
 
As leaders of a self-declared ambitious maritime nation, Norway’s political elite 
has embraced the Blue Economy as the cornerstone of the country’s future. 
Illustrating Choi’s assertion that the Blue Economy agenda institutionalises 
governmentality, Norway’s leaders go beyond simply appealing to the ideal of 
sustainability. Rather, Norwegian officials assert that in the hostile, complex, and 
interconnected environment of the ocean frontier, the intersection of what Choi 
calls ‘infinite possibilities in finite spaces’ requires proactive management. Thus, 
for sustainability to be achieved in the ocean, environmental sensitivity and a 
thirst for growth must be informed by the application of knowledge. Norway 
claims a long history of understanding, extracting resources from, and 
sustainably managing its northern waters; indeed the encounter with the Arctic 
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as a fundamentally maritime region plays a central role in Norwegian state 
identity (Medby 2015, see also Leira et al. 2007).  
 
 Thus, Norway’s institutional knowledge and history of the Arctic marine 
environment (which might be joined together via the concept of expertise) are 
heralded by Norwegian officials as justifications for Norway’s leadership. This 
fusion of history with knowledge is buttressed in turn by appeals to geographic 
destiny. Labour Party leader Jonas Gahr Støre has stressed that Norway will 
“conquer ocean space” by becoming a “global knowledge hub” akin to Silicon 
Valley (Støre 2015), while also noting that “for Norway (being) North in the 
world, North - towards the Arctic, nobody is better positioned than us…” In a 
similar vein, the Norwegian Government’s 2017 Ocean Strategy, New Growth, 
Proud History, boasts of Norway’s leading presence across a range of ocean 
sectors: 
Every day hundreds of thousands of Norwegians go to work in the ocean 
industries, which together represent about 70 per cent of our export 
income. Norway is one of the world's largest producers of oil and gas. We 
are one of the world's largest and most advanced seafaring nations. We 
are the world's second largest exporter of fish and seafood. In addition, 
we have a world class service and supply industry. Norway is also at the 
forefront of marine research and responsible management of marine 
resources. (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries / Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy 2017: 4) 
The strategy, which builds upon a previous strategy, Maritime Possibilities: Blue 
Growth for a Green Future (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 2015), 
emphasises the embeddedness of the marine economy across sectors and 
stresses how the marine sector is at the forefront for developing economic 
knowledge and practice. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken up the 
programme as well. Stressing the Blue Economy strategy’s alignment with UN 
Sustainable Development Goal 14, (which calls for conservation and sustainable 
use of the oceans), the Ministry publicises Norway’s commitment to ocean 
development to evidence the country’s environmentalist credentials (Aas 2017; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). 
 
 In short, Norway is positioning itself as the Arctic Ocean’s rightful and 
natural steward, a country with the capacity, presence, and vision, as well as the 
appropriate geographic location and cultural-economic history, to manage its 
northern waters. Norway thus claims to be poised to maximise production and 
conservation across a range of sectors, while minimising conflict. Norway 
advocates its maritime manifest destiny2 through the management of a single, 
integrated plan for extracting value from the ocean that will facilitate “blue 
growth through green restructuring” (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries / 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2017: 8). Norwegian officials have often 
described this as a single, multi-sector ocean industry, where technology and 
                                                        
2 Manifest destiny is a term that originated in the United States in the 1840s, 
when expansionist journalists and their allies in office asserted that, due to the 
confluence of historic, geographic, and cultural factors, the United States was 
naturally destined to expand across the extent of the North American continent. 
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knowledge are smooth and mobile, floating across and among the various 
sectors that extract value from the sea. Thus the Conservative Party’s press 
release announcing the strategy declared that the “new ocean strategy will 
ensure more jobs in the ocean industry“ (Høyre 2017). The same year, the 
Labour Party’ Jonas Gahr Støre launched his campaign for Prime Minister by 
noting that “the first thing I will do as Prime Minister is to establish a value 
creation program for the ocean industries” (Norwegian Broadcasting Agency 
2017). This vision of a single, multi-sectoral ocean industry (or, in Støre’s terms, 
a linked family of industries) is illustrated in a poster produced for a 2016 
workshop co-organised by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries and the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Figure 1). Wind power, oil drilling, fish 
farming, and trawling exist in peaceful co-existence, aided by the gaze of a 
satellite and the order of a geodetic map. The material properties of the ocean – 
the presence of sea ice, the topography of the seabed, the power of currents, the 
variability of depth – not to mention the conflicts that persist among multiple 
users, are elided amidst the ideal of peaceful co-existence under the watchful eye 
of the state. 
 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
 
Figure 1: Poster from conference on the Norwegian seabed (Bergen, 30 May 
2016), sponsored by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, and the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. Reprinted with permission from the Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Fisheries.  
 
Blue Economy, Brown Oil 
Not evident from this poster, however, is that this managerial approach toward 
an ocean of multiple, compatible uses united by the pursuit of a Blue Economy, 
has its origins in the remaking of the North in the wake of an energy crisis. As 
Norway’s oil production peaked in 2001, the oil industry and its state allies 
increasingly turned toward northern waters as the country’s next hydrocarbon 
frontier. However, the extension of hydrocarbon exploration to the Norwegian 
Arctic opened a new space of political conflict, as the potential for oil and gas 
drilling sat uneasily amidst efforts to sustain local and national fishing 
economies as well as protect rich ecosystems in fragile Arctic environments. To 
meet its various goals, the Norwegian state proposed an integrated approach 
based on the zoning of ocean space. The Lofoten-Barents Sea Management Plan, 
which sought to “facilitate the coexistence of different industries, particularly the 
fisheries industry, maritime transport and petroleum industry” (Ministry of 
Environment 2006: 7-8). The plan established guidelines for hydrocarbon 
extraction in the country’s northernmost waters while calling for the protection 
of a number of environmentally sensitive regions, including the fishing-rich 
Lofoten islands in the southern part of the Norwegian Arctic and the areas 
around the marginal ice zone (the area with seasonal ice cover) in the North.  
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 While the strategy of constructing order through allocating specific 
activities to individual regions is a common technique of the managerial state, 
including in ocean regions (Steinberg 2011), it has the effect of depoliticising 
what are, in fact, inherently conflictual situations. Choi notes that the Blue 
Economy agenda often celebrates the coexistence of various groups “that may be 
incompatible in other venues” (Choi 2017:40), and this would certainly seem to 
be the case with Norway’s advocacy of a single ‘ocean industry’ that unites 
numerous means for extracting value from the sea. In fact, a close examination of 
Figure 1 reveals that its vision is dependent on a number of cartopolitical 
oversimplifications. Although spatial differentiation can be employed to prevent 
the co-location of incompatible economic activities, many ocean activities have 
impacts that affect other, adjacent areas. Thus, for instance, although the image 
shows the oil rig and the school of herring coexisting by occupying different 
areas of ocean-space, in actuality the fish could swim under the rig or, 
conversely, pollution from the well could contaminate adjacent fish habitats. 
Additionally, all spatial management strategies have outer bounds, both for 
defining the limits of the space being managed and for defining the extent of 
managed activities. In the case of the Norwegian ‘ocean industry’ graphic, the 
focus is exclusively on the deep sea, which means that both coastal regions and 
coastal activities are, quite literally, off the map. In actuality, some of the most 
heated contests in Norwegian ocean management in the past decades have 
involved coastal residents who have contested further expansion of the ‘resource 
frontier’ whether through nearshore oil and gas drilling, mining (dumping 
waste) or fish farming. The image thus smoothes over potential dispossessions, 
or ‘new extractivism’ in the “name of sustainable ocean management” (Winder 
and Le Heron 2017: 20).  
 
 The Norwegian oil industry has a long history of co-opting opposition by 
proclaiming its environmentalist credentials (Kristoffersen 2014), and the 
repositioning of that industry as the cornerstone of an emergent Blue Economy 
would seem to be a continuation of this trend. Indeed, while the commitment to 
develop new marine technologies may be seen, in one sense, as part of a 
programme for advancing Norway’s ocean economy beyond oil and gas, these 
technological developments can also permit oil and gas extraction to reach into 
new frontiers. The technological fusion thus goes in both directions. As the 
Minister of Fisheries told the European Commission, “Testing new technologies 
are also central points to our ocean strategy. Norway has a long-standing 
tradition of transferring knowledge between industries. And we would like to 
see more of this” (Sandberg 2017). The implication here is that out of this 
technological fusion Norway will become the leader in a new multi-sector ocean 
industry that can set a high-technology, low-environmental-impact model for 
countries around the world as they seek to engage the Blue Economy in pursuit 
of sustainable development. 
 
Conclusion: Contesting the Blue Economy 
 
As the quotations presented at the beginning of this chapter suggest, Norway’s 
turn to a Blue Economy strategy crosses, and claims to transcend, political 
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divides. It thus echoes the concept of the post-political, in which contesting 
practices and priorities are subsumed within questions of ‘management’. A 
number of scholars, most notably Eric Swyngedouw (2007), have associated this 
celebration of the post-political with the turn to sustainable development 
discourse. Within the sustainable development discourse, the omniscient state 
asserts its authority in the name of efficiency and productivity, securing a future 
for itself and its citizens and thereby elevating itself seemingly above politics.  
 
 As our analysis of Norway’s Blue Economy strategy suggests, Norwegian 
ocean management policy is directed less toward the sustainable management of 
the marine environment than toward the expansion of oil and gas production in 
a manner that accommodates other ocean uses. The state thus emerges as both 
the initiator and beneficiary of these management activities. Indeed, its 
institutions, as well as its authority, are deemed necessary for keeping politics 
out of the sea. And yet despite the best efforts of politicians from both the left 
and the right, ocean policy remains a central focus of political conflict.  For 
instance, in the national election in September 2017, the future of the offshore oil 
and gas industry and its central role in the Norwegian economy were key points 
of debate (Holter 2017; Lahn 2017). The ensuing discussion over the petroleum 
economy spilled over to related questions in marine management, including the 
government’s ambition to quintuple production from aquaculture as well as 
concerns regarding the rights of coastal fleets to fishery resources. In short, the 
integrated, spatially differentiated, multi-sector “ocean industry” depicted in 
Figure 1 emerged less as a model of post-political consensus than as a 
comprehensive list of areas for public contestation.  
 
 In conclusion, the Blue Economy agenda, as a state programme that seeks 
to blend the sustainable development discourse with a turn to post-political 
management, is itself the site of political conflict. As such, it should be 
understood less as a means for rationalising the longevity of ocean resources 
than as a means for legitimising and maintaining state power, as well as 
extending that power to emergent resource frontiers. As the world’s oceans 
present new opportunities for the realisation of state power, the case of 
Norway’s Blue Economy agenda reminds us that efforts to sustain the seas may 
be rooted in efforts to sustain the state. 
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